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Abstract: 
Karl Barth leaves room by his own principles for further, even different thinking about Jews and 
gender (and, as a corollary, about homosexuality) than he records in the Dogmatics. Now that 
Marquardt, Klappert, Sonderegger, Soulen, and others have offered sympathetic critiques from a 
generally Barthian point of view, and Eberhard Busch has exhaustively laid to rest any 
biographical questions of Barth’s relation to the Jewish people in his 1996 book, Unter dem 
Bogen des einen Bundes: Karl Barth und die Juden 1933–1945, the way lies open to carry 
forward Barth’s theological critique of nineteenth century theology and of abstraction further 
into the areas of Jews and gender, and to propose constructive pneumatological and exegetical 
supplements to his thinking. Barth’s thinking on women and men, like his thinking on Jews, 
labors, for all its promise in its time, under a defect he calls abstraction. Barth faulted Calvin for 
abstracting both elect human beings and the electing God from Jesus Christ, whom Barth called 
the elect human being and the electing God in one. Yet on the election of the community Barth 
did not entirely escape the abstraction. In the manner of Augustine’s Retractions, Barth wrote to 
Maruardt toward the end of his life that he had been so busy with (theological) Israel that he had 
had no time for the Jews. Does Barth, as Marquardt and Sonderegger suggest, throw up despite 
himself a conceptual screen onto which he at once projects an abstraction (“Israel”) and behind 
which he hides actual human beings (“the Jews”), a screen resistant to the blowing of the Spirit? 
Do the concepts “ man” and “ woman” form a similar conceptual screen, dating from 
Schleiermacher’s dialogue Christmas Eve, in which men and women (like Christians and Jews) 
have essentially different responses to the incarnation of Jesus Christ? Das ewig M??nnliche and 
das ewig Weibliche, inherited from German romanticism, see to run afoul of Barth’s trinitarian 
particularism, as does “ Israel”. Yet further application of Barth’s own principles, including more 
attention to the Spirit, leaves him more options in his treatment of Jews and gender, and richer 
exegesis – including exegesis by anagogy. 
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Hypothetical Critique  
Karl Barth made remarkable and beautiful innovations in his theological accounts of Israel and 
of men and women. After Barth, two things had changed for Christian theology—quite apart 
from the Holocaust and the women's movement. The Jews could no longer be other than the 
people of God, and women could no longer be deficient men. As a matter of christo-logical 
exegesis, Israel becomes again the chosen people of God, beside whom Gentiles retain their 
goyishness, and women become constitutive of the image of God, integral to a co-humanity 
consummated in the neighbor-love of Jesus. Author of the Barmen Declaration, the document of 
Christian resistance to Naziism, Barth also writes of the Jews in Germany in 1942:  
[I]t is incontestable that this people as such is the people of God: the people with whom 
God has dealt in His grace and in His wrath; in the midst of whom He has blessed and 
judged, enlightened and hardened, accepted and rejected; whose cause either way He has 
made His own, and has not ceased to make His own, and will not cease to make His own. 
They are all of them sanctified by Him, sanctified as ancestors and kinsmen of the Holy 
One in Israel, in a sense that Gentiles are not by nature, not even the best of Gentiles, not 
even the Gentile Christians, not even the best of Gentile Christians .. .2 
It is ironic, therefore, that fifty years later Barth looks retrograde to many on just the topics on 
which at mid-century he lead the vanguard. The question arises whether Barth's thinking on 
gender resembles his thinking on Jews also in this, that both accounts have yet to emerge 
completely—perhaps because they began to emerge so early—from a defect Barth calls 
abstraction, in this case an abstraction from the Spirit. Although so far as I know no one has put 
together the topics Jews, gender, and Spirit in this way, each component has already caused 
misgivings in Barth's admirers. Consider the following threefold critique.  
1. Barth's student Friedrich Marquardt worries that (as Sonderegger summarizes it) "at times, 
Barth is tempted to reduce the Jews to a cipher, to a mirror that reflects life, but lives none of its 
own."3 Barth had faulted his own Reformed tradition for abstracting both elect or predestined 
human beings and the electing God from Jesus Christ, whom he called the elect human being and 
the electing God in one. Yet when he turned to the election of the community he renewed the 
abstraction in part. It is despite himself, therefore, that Barth's rhetoric sometimes runs to der 
ewige Jude. Marquardt compiled—and showed to Barth—the following list.  
In paragraph 34 of the Church Dogmatics, Barth refers to the Synagogue as "the 
monstrous [ungeheure] shadow-side of Israel's history," "the disobedient, idolatrous 
Israel of every age," "the whole of Israel on the left hand, sanctified only by God's 
wrath"; he says that the Synagogue is "the Synagogue of death," which, to be sure, "hears 
the Word and yet for and in all its hearing is still unbelieving," is "the tragic, weirdly 
[unheimlich] painful figure with blindfolded eyes," the "living petrification of the Old 
Testament in itself and in abstracto/' an "organization of a humanity which again and 
again hastens toward an empty future." That organization, Barth states, is "the 
phenomenon of the unbelieving, the refractory Synagogue," which is characterized by a 
"vaunting lie" and its "nationalistic-legalistic Messiah-dream"; it stands there like a 
"spectral form"; its members are "wretched members of the Synagogue"; "the Synagogue 
Jews are not numbered among the obedient." Rather, the Synagogue is "the debased 
Israel of the Synagogue," it stands as "an enemy of God," which "has no part anymore in 
the fulfillment of the promise given to it," going by a "cheerless chronology," living a 
"carnal hope," taking a stand on "a carnal loyalty to itself," and practicing "Jewish 
obduracy, melancholy, caprice, and phantasy"—in short, the Synagogue cuts the figure of 
"a half-venerable, half-gruesome relic, of a marvelously preserved antique," the figure of 
"the human crone [menschlicher Schrulle]." (CD II/2,195ff.)4  
After such examples, it seems mild to ask, with Marquardt and Sonderegger:  
Israel as an environment, as mirror, mediating and reflecting another's will: are these not 
the terms of Idealism, subtly altered? Does Barth's treatment of Israel ... not denigrate 
history, reduce history itself to the Idea, now chastely called Jesus Christ? Is the 
particularity of election, of Israel's election, not here eviscerated, to be refilled instead 
with the Christian themes of disobedience and self-reproach?5  
Despite himself, Barth throws up a conceptual screen onto which he can at once project a partial 
abstraction ("Israel") and hide actual human beings ("the Jews") behind it. Worse, it is a screen 
that protects him from the blowing of the Spirit.  
2. The concepts "man" and "woman" form a similar conceptual screen, dating from 
Schleiermacher's early 19th C. dialogue Christmas Eve, in which men and women (like 
Christians and Jews) have different responses to Jesus Christ.6 Das ewig Maennliche and das 
ewig Weibliche, binary structures inherited from German romanticism, admit of critique in terms 
of Barth's trinitarian particularism, much as his doctrine of Israel does.  
3. Meanwhile, a consensus has developed among a large number of Barth scholars that Barth 
leaves room to pay more attention to the Holy Spirit. As Robert Jenson writes, "Karl Barth is the 
initiator and the model ... of this century's renewal of trinitarian theology ... The near-unanimity 
is therefore remarkable, with which a recent meeting of the Karl Barth Society of North America 
agreed that long stretches of Barth's thinking seem rather binitarian than trinitarian."7  
Does Barth's reticence about the Spirit, both in his treatment of Church and Synagogue and in his 
treatment of men and women, help to explain anything about the power of binary categories in 
those cases?  
Initial Objection and Reply: Barth's Doctrine of Israel  
Because Barth had "discovered the Jews," in Marquardt's phrase, for Christian theology, because 
his doctrine of election otherwise succeeded in expressing "the sum of the Gospel, because of all 
the words that can be said or heard it is the best,"8 and because he stood as the author of Barmen 
against the Nazis and later for Israel, it is shocking to hear the tenor of Barth's rhetoric in 
Marquardt's list. In earlier drafts I suppressed the list as the worst Barth has to offer. I include it 
now because I saw that Barth himself had read and accepted it. Of the many implicit and explicit 
calls Barth made for improvement in his doctrine of Israel, I choose three:  
1. Much farther on in the Dogmatics, in its last long volume (1959), Barth wrote in a different 
vein, blaming the Church, rather than the Synagogue, for the wound in the people of God. In a 
characteristic reversal, the notorious "]udenfrage" becomes the "Kirchenfrage."  
[The Church] must call [the Synagogue] by joining with it as [the Messiah's] people, and 
therefore with Him. No particular function can be this call, but only the life of the 
community as a whole authentically lived before the Jews. It need hardly be said that the 
life of the community as a whole neither has been nor is this call. To this day Christianity 
has not succeeded in impressing itself upon Israel as the witness of its own most proper 
reality and truth, of the fulfilled word of God in the Old Testament. It has certainly not 
succeeded in making it jealous, in making clear to it the nearness of the kingdom as the 
kingdom of the Son of David, in making Jesus of Nazareth dear and desirable and 
inviting to it. In this sense the Church as a whole has made no convincing impression on 
the Jew as a whole. It has debated with him, tolerated him, persecuted him, or abandoned 
him to persecution without protest.... This failure ... is one of the darkest chapters in the 
whole history of Christianity and one of the most serious wounds in the body of Christ. 
Even the modern ecumenical movement suffers more seriously from the absence of Israel 
than of Rome or Moscow.... The recurrent Jewish question is the question of Christ and 
the Church... .9 (CD IV/3/2, 878) 
2. In August 1966 Barth received a visit from Michael Wyschogrod, and proved willing, on the 
basis of God's trustworthiness, to entertain a question about the entire promise-fulfillment 
structure for construing the relation between Israel and the Church:  
[Barth] had been told that I was a "Jewish Barthian," and this amused him no end ... [A]t one 
point he said, "You Jews have the promise but not the fulfillment; we Christians have both 
promise and fulfillment." Influenced by the banking atmosphere of Basel, I replied: "With human 
promises, one can have the promise but not the fulfillment. The one who promises can die, or 
change his mind, or not fulfill his promise for any number of reasons. But a promise of God is 
like money in the bank. If we have his promise, we have its fulfillment and if we do not have the 
fulfillment we do not have the promise." There was a period of silence and then he said: "You 
know, I never thought of it that way."10  
3. Most important, Barth found himself willing to accept, explicitly and without reservation, 
Marquardt's critique of his doctrine of Israel. He raised no objection even to Marquardt's harshest 
expressions. He rejected excuses. He encouraged improvements. Marquardt's book appeared in 
1967. On September 5 of that year, at the very end of his life, Barth wrote Marquardt:  
I have just finished reading your book. For two and one-half days it kept me holding my 
breath or breathless ....  
You have discovered and expounded my doctrine of Israel with great skill and finesse, 
and historically and materially I can raise no objection. This doctrine of mine was ... 
impressing and convincing to me ... before I came to §5 ....  
You had good cause to develop the criticism made in §5.1 can only say two things, not by 
way of excuse, but by way of explanation. 
1. Biblical Israel as such gave me so much to think about and to cope with that I simply did not 
have the time or intellectual strength to look more closely at Baeck, Buber, Rosenzweig, etc. as 
you have now done in such worthy fashion.  
2. I am decidedly not a philosemite, in that in personal encounters with living Jews (even Jewish 
Christians) I have always, so long as I can remember, had to suppress a totally irrational 
aversion, naturally suppressing it at once on the basis of all my presuppositions, and concealing 
it totally in all my statements, yet still having to suppress and conceal it. Pfui! is all I can say to 
this in some sense allergic reaction of mine.... A good thing that this reprehensible instinct is 
totally alien to my sons and other better people than myself (including you). But it could have 
had a retrogressive effect on my doctrine of Israel.  
... May this not happen to you in the projected improvement of my first attempt! ...11 
Although a critique like Marquardt's is still controversial, it need not be.121 seek to extend his 
critique of unintended Idealism from Jews to gender. I seek, more importantly, to expand the 
appeal to particularity from Christ to the Spirit, and to retrieve (not analogy but) anagogy 
alongside typology. (One of the four medieval senses, anagogy "leads up," reading the bible in 
light of the eschatological community, as when "Let there be light" means "let us be led into 
glory."") In so doing I prefer Barth to his defenders; I hope only to deploy a critique that Barth 
accepted and suggest improvements that Barth invited. My aim is less to rehearse the critique 
than to cast it in such a way as to suggest how to go on.  
Three Further Objections  
Even as a constructive project of retrieval, the approach invites three further objections.  
1. Why attempt to cover Jews and gender in the same essay? They are two very large topics, and 
their relation, for Barth, seems distant at best.  
2. What view of reality underlies the conjunction of topics? Although the topics of Jews and 
gender are closely related in the postmodern study of oppression,14 that connection has much to 
do with the evidential significance of historical and empirical reality, but little to do with the 
exegetical and christological warrants that define reality for Barth.  
3. Why turn to pneumatological rather than christological judgments for the supplement? Despite 
complaints of binitarianism, Barth devoted hundreds if not thousands of pages to the Spirit. 
Besides, Christians with views of the Spirit more robust than Barth's, from the Pentecostals to the 
Orthodox, can hold views of Jews and women arguably less progressive than his. 
Replies and Qualifications  
"Because the election of God is real, there is such a thing as love and marriage."15 So Karl Barth 
deeply and beautifully connects one doctrine, election, which has to do with the Jews, and 
another, human love and marriage, that has to do with gender. The connection is christological 
and exegetical; it arises, that is, from biblical tropes about God as the jealous lover of Israel and 
Christ as the bridegroom of the church. It fulfills, therefore, Barth's requirement that theological 
statements should be christologically "concrete" rather than "abstract"; that is, they do not 
abstract the Father from Christ the Son to produce an uninvolved God, or the human being from 
Christ the verus homo to produce a God-forsaken creature. The exegetical procedure appropriate 
to such claims is that of typology, which reads a passage as figuring Christ. The chief older mode 
of exegesis that Barth revives, typology, defines realistic exegesis for Barth, as Christ defines the 
real. Since the study of oppression, on the other hand, tends to define reality historically and 
empirically, an attempt to address Barth on the grounds of the usual connection of Jews and 
gender would therefore seem, on its face, designed to fail. I offer two answers to this charge.  
1. Ironically enough, it is Barth, according to Marquardt, who introduces natural theology into 
his doctrine of Israel. Defenders find the sting from Barth's portrayal of the Synagogue lessened, 
in that the Synagogue represents the sinfulness "only" of the human being as such. Yet because 
for Barth human pride first comes to light and is visible—empirical—in the history of the 
Jews—Marquardt can write that for Barth, "The Jews are the empirical and to this extent: [they 
become] the observable and effective representation of [the human] predicament; in other words, 
the Jews are for Barth the proof of the kernel of truth of natural theology within the revelation of 
grace."16 Marquardt says that by way of observation, not criticism: it is not only a theological and 
biblical but a Barthian rationale revealing why the empirical is strictly appropriate in the case of 
the Jews. Barth allows a "demythologiza-tion"—or remythologization—not of Jesus, but of his 
people. Thus Barth not once but often and in complete seriousness offers the survival of the Jews 
as an empirical proof of God's existence,17 as well as of human pride. Mar-quardt's observation, 
while not intended directly as criticism, does put Barth in a bind. Either it is not appropriate to 
adduce the empirical history of rabbinic Judaism, "the Synagogue," or there is a great deal more 
evidence to consider, including "Baeck, Buber, and Rosenzweig"—in short, Jewish self-
understanding.  
2. Although Barth elsewhere insists that empirical reality, the evidential significance of history, 
and the self-understanding of groups are never the defining object of dogmatic theology, he also 
refused to immunize his theology against their claims, and he did so long before the famous 
opening to the "little lights of creation" later in his work. The biblical system hermetically sealed 
off against the world is a parody of Barth, opposing his christology. Although the office of 
dogmatics is to test the proclamation of the church against the Word of God, not against 
empirical reality or evidential history, Barth raises and answers the question, already in CD 1/1: 
Can God speak through those other signs? Yes, of course; it is a matter of God's freedom; and 
yet God does not exercise freedom capriciously or abstractly, but according to God's own self-
determination, or concretely, in a trinitarian pattern. On the pattern of the enhypostatic taking on 
of flesh by the Logos, the triune God assumes human words into the divine Word.18 On the 
pattern of the founding of the church by the Spirit, the triune God baptizes human speakers into 
the divine community. If and when, therefore, God in freedom should speak to the church about 
its proclamation from empirical events or evidentiary history, God's speech does not remain 
external to God's Word, but is by definition internal to it—just as the incarnation confirms that 
human flesh is not external but internal to God, from the beginning of God's free self-
determination to be God also for us. Empirical events and evidentiary history, should God 
assume them into the Word, do not break the rule that the community tests its proclamation by 
God's Word, but prove it. Similarly, groups whose self-understandings really call the church to 
account do not break the rule that God speaks within the community, but prove that the Spirit 
founds the community with just such a call. Circular? Yes indeed, Barth would say, and 
virtuously so, insofar as the circularity of the argument traces the trinitarian perichoresis. Thus 
we read:  
[T]here can be nothing to prevent God from turning even such utterance concerning Him 
into proclamation of His Word to us which, in its character as sanctified utterance within 
the Church, is at first partially or even totally concealed from us. If the Church is visible, 
this need not imply that we actually see it in its full compass, that the dimensions of its 
sphere might not be very different from what we think we know them to be. God may 
suddenly be pleased to have Abraham blessed by Melchizedek, or Israel blessed by 
Balaam or helped by Cyrus.... He can establish the Church anew and directly when and 
where and how it pleases Him....  
Hence it can never be the case that the Word of God is confined to the proclamation of 
the existing Church, or to the proclamation of the Church as known to us, or to the 
proclamation in this known Church which specially claims to be proclamation [i.e., in 
official or magisterial pronouncements]. Church proclamation itself, in fact, regards itself 
only as service of the Word of God, as a means of grace in God's free hand. Hence it 
cannot be master of the Word, nor try to regard the Word as confined within its own 
borders....  
God may speak to us through Russian Communism, a flute concerto, a blossoming shrub, 
or a dead dog.... [T]he boundary between the  
Church and the secular world can still take at any time a different course from that which 
we think we discern.19  
Nevertheless, a word from the outside is not self-validating, is not entitled to prophetic authority 
within the church, until tested by exegesis. To make the test is the task of dogmatics, "the 
wissenschaftlich self-examination of the Christian Church with respect to the content of its 
distinctive talk about God."20 The Word of God in Christ includes what survives a test against the 
Word of God in Scripture. The Spirit of Christ in the church includes what survives the 
discernment of spirits. It is because Christ's Spirit puts down and raises up challenges to the 
church's exegesis, bringing it into greater conformity with the Word, that pneumatological 
judgments can prove especially "open or eager to register the cantankerous details available only 
through discernment of public reality."21  
That the cantankerous details of public reality urging reform of the church's proclamation about 
Jews and gender may belong to movements of the Spirit, emerges from their presence in not only 
the church unknown to Barthians, but even in the church known to them. For the church to listen 
to the experience of Jews and women and gay and lesbian people is not necessarily just another 
species of illicit natural theology, but a self-examination by some churches' own, internal 
doctrinal norms. That God wills the continued existence of Jews as an identifiable people, not 
absorbed into the Gentile mass, is now church dogma for large numbers of the faithful,22 whom 
Barth's doctrine must continue to interest. That homosexual persons are specially in need of 
pastoral care and deserving of further theological reflection is now the official position of the 
Catholic magisterium.23 So moves the Spirit also within the church known to Barthians that 
excite it to test traditional views by renewed exegesis.  
Several reasons outweigh the disadvantages of holding the topics of Jews and gender together.  
1) The reception of Barth's views on both Jews and gender has undergone an about-face, reason 
enough to ask after connections (if not to find them). Despite Barth's confession that he was "no 
philosemite," no less a witness than Theodor Adorno regarded him as "grenzlos 
philosemitisch"24 on the Jews, while others regarded him as innovative in rendering women 
constitutive of co-humanity with men. Yet now critics regard him with suspicions of a rhetoric 
positively medieval on the Jews and hopelessly hierarchical on women.2"  
2) Critics regard the two reversals as related not accidentally but formally. Both critiques accuse 
Barth of throwing up a conceptual screen onto which he can project an abstraction (the Church 
and the Synagogue, Man and Woman) and hide real people (the Jews, men and women). Both 
question the Dogmatics' Realitätsbezug, or relation to reality. A critique Barth's defenders reject 
has acquired the Lukan urgency of the knocker persisting at midnight or the widow importuning 
the unjust judge. 
3) Barth himself launched critiques of his theological predecessors with the charge of 
"abstraction." He made Luther and Calvin guilty of "abstraction" in their doctrine of election, 
Schleiermacher in his entire anthropology. Is Barth's worry the same or different? If similar, it 
raises the possibility of internal critique.  
4) It would appear that Barth's own critique of abstraction has little in common with his 
detractors', since Barth defines the "real" differently—until we recall the distinctively Barthian 
critique of the nineteenth century, especially Schleiermacher, and that Barth's treatments of Jews 
and gender appear to reflect examined or unexamined but formally similar nineteenth-century 
Platonisms about das ewig Weibliche or der ewige Jude. Such Piatonisms may fall to an 
extension of Barth's own Schleiermacher-critique: Jews and gender belong together because they 
are both matters Barth picks up out of German romanticism, especially if they are matters he 
greatly, but incompletely, reworks.  
5) Most interesting of all, Barth perceived and elevated a deep conjunction, even a marriage 
between the two topics, one quite different from the conjunction discerned by historians of 
oppression, and one he did not regard as a theological conceit or quaint anachronism, but as an 
ontological feature of God's covenant with humankind richly apt for theological elaboration: as 
creation is the external ground of the covenant, and covenant the internal ground of creation, so 
the love of man for woman is the external ground of God's love for Israel, and God's love for 
Israel the internal ground of man's love for woman.26  
6) That connection carries us deeply into Barth's greatest strategy for reading the Bible, namely 
typology. Of the four medieval senses, Barth pro-lifically practiced three—the literal, the 
typological, and the moral. One of the two disused ones, typology, he retrieved with great self-
conscious satisfaction. It is the odder therefore that a work so rich in ecclesial reflection as the 
Church Dogmatics never reflects explicitly upon the other, anagogy, the ecclesial sense. Perhaps 
that is because it is also the eschatological sense, and Barth's eschatology went unfinished. 
Anagogy, seeing communities in the light of glory, proposes compatible supplements to Barth's 
pneumatology and exegesis.  
The connection of Jews and gender lies deep in the structure of Barth's thought, in his inheritance 
from the 19th C. and in his critique of it, in his exegetical practice and in his trinitarian 
concreteness. Barth always took a lively interest in politics. Those features invest a political 
critique with theological interest.27 
Barth's Critique of Abstraction  
Barth's critique of abstraction does not, however, attempt in the first instance to attend to 
"empirical" reality, or descriptions of reality undisciplined by the Word of God in Christ. Barth 
would not say that a theology is abstract  
 
because it favors the biblical witness to Christ over empirical descriptions, or theological "Israel" 
over empirical "Jews." Rather he calls a theology abstract that favors empirical descriptions over 
the details of the biblical narratives. The "real" world for Barth is "the strange new world within 
the Bible."28 The critique of abstraction does not address the problem of Realitätsbezug, as reality 
is commonly understood; rather it addresses theology's Realitätsbezug precisely as God in Christ 
defines what reality is. That means that Barth's critique of abstraction centers on such topics as 
trinitarian doctrine and biblical narrative. It does not ignore such topics as statistics and secular 
history, but may absorb them magisterially, as a center takes in its periphery, because the critique 
of abstraction aims not to constrain but to honor God's freedom, not to impoverish exegesis but 
to enrich it.  
Let me give an example. Barth's most famous and successful innovation in all the Church 
Dogmatics is his reformulation of the doctrine of election. Barth diagnoses traditional doctrines 
of election as suffering under a twofold abstraction: an unknown electing God, a Deus 
absconditus whose ways are past finding out, whose freedom abstracts from love, and whose 
character abstracts from the revelation in Jesus Christ; and an unknown elected human being, the 
object of God's caprice and therefore at sea (e.g., CD II/2,103-104).  
Latet periculum in generalibus: we were forced to say this of the first error, and we must now 
repeat it with reference to the second. In the first case we were forced to challenge the general 
character of the proposed view of humanity. In the second, we must challenge the general 
character of the proposed concept of God. (CD II/2, 48-49; emphasis added)  
Barth cures the twofold abstraction with a singular concreteness or particularity: Jesus Christ is 
the electing God and the elect human being in one.29  
... In the doctrine of predestination we have to do with the understanding both of God and of the 
human being in particular: in the particular relationship in which God is the true God and the 
human being the true human being. (CD II/2, 51; emphasis added)  
[The doctrine of election] must begin concretely with the acknowledgment of Jesus Christ as 
both the electing God and the elected human being. (CD 11/2, 76; emphasis added)  
Although Barth claims never to deploy a method, he does reveal a certain evaluative and 
constructive procedure in criticizing his predecessors and defending his innovation, marked by 
negative words like "absolute," which goes with "general" and "abstract," and positive words like 
"definition" and "determination," which go with "particular." From a large number of texts in CD 
II/2,1 pick out a number of features.  
1) The particular attends to the story of Jesus. Not just any particularity will do. Barth inveighs 
against a particularity deduced "as a species from a genus" (CD II/2, 48), and against Calvin's 
"particular," i.e., empirical,  
 
interests (CD 11/2, 37). Nor is it even a christological principle or method, when the emphasis 
falls upon the nouns. Rather "In itself, and as such, the particular leads us to the general, which 
it includes within itself" (CD II/2,51; emphasis added). The particular is christological in a 
recognizable way; in Hegelian language, Christ is the concrete universal.30 Yet Barth does not 
make Christ the concrete universal to pursue a Hegelian method or a Durk-heimian explication, 
however powerful they may be. Rather he finds the Hegelian-Durkheimian insight strictly 
appropriate to the peculiar character of God.  
[T]he true God is the One whose freedom and love have nothing to do with abstract 
absoluteness or naked sovereignty, but who in His love and freedom has determined and 
limited Himself to be God in particular and not in general, and only as such to be 
omnipotent and sovereign and the possessor of all other perfections. (CD II/2, 49; 
emphasis added)  
We know God in the particular human being Jesus Christ as he is available to us not even in 
dogma but in the text. As Barth wrote to Berkouwer, "in each individual theological question I 
seek to orientate myself afresh—to some extent from the very beginning—not to christological 
dogma but to Jesus Christ himself (viviti regnati triumphat!)."31  
2) Abstraction is at root an insufficiency in trinitarian thinking. While Barth explicates and 
defends the knowledge of God as particular by displaying that particularity in the biblical stories 
about Jesus Christ, he also explicates and elaborates the being of God as particular by reference 
to the Trinity. Thus in the doctrine of election, Barth accuses the Reformers of a trinitarian 
mistake; without intending to, they had proceeded as if the Father alone were the electing God, 
and not also the Son.  
Particularity is trinitarian not so much textually in Barth as architectonically. In fact, the only 
places where the Trinity becomes a subject of explicit reflection in the doctrine of election warn 
that just as one can speak of Christ, but abstractly, so one can also speak abstractly of the Trinity.  
It is [a] temptation to think of God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit merely as a Subject... 
which differs from other such subjects only by the fact that its election is absolutely free 
God is not in abstracto Father, Son  and Holy Ghost, the Triune God. He is so with a 
definite purpose and reference.... (CD II/2,100, 79; emphasis added)  
Barth causes the doctrine of the Trinity to arise from "the being of God as the One who loves in 
freedom" (title of §28); "a correct doctrine of election" (title of §32) arises from God's self-
determination to be "for the human being too the One who loves in freedom" (Letitsatz of §32). 
So "the One who loves in freedom" is the hinge that connects the two halves of the doctrine of 
God together, CD II/l and 11/2, the being of God and the correctness of a doctrine of election. 
And election, therefore, is simply the application of the Trinitarian  
 
doctrine to human beings. God is the God that God is, not only for God, but also for us; God is 
Trinity not only for God or in se but also for us. That is what it means to be that God, the God 
revealed in Jesus Christ. But God's being for us is an action of the whole Trinity ad extra, and 
therefore indivisible from the Holy Spirit. Although reticence about the Holy Spirit does not in 
itself constitute a flaw, neither can it be wrong to elaborate the critique of abstraction in a 
pneumatological way. In the only (!) place where the Spirit gets a material role in the doctrine of 
election, it is possible just to glimpse Barth making the same move to particularize the move 
from God in se to God for us, if you keep in mind that it is proper to the Spirit to glorify the love 
of the Father and the Son:  
[God's] glory, which in Himself, in His inner life as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, cannot 
be subjected to attack or disturbance,... [is ordained to enter] the sphere of 
contradiction.... [Therefore, i]n the beginning it was the resolve of the Holy Spirit that the 
unity of God, of Father and Son should not be disturbed or rent by this covenant with the 
human being, but that it should be made the more glorious.... (CD II/2, 169, 101; 
emphasis added)  
3. Theology regards the mirrorings provided by empirical reality (ordinary sense) as distinctly 
dim; when Barth sees clearly, he relates "empirical" reality to the bible and sees types 
(correspondences to Christ). Types are precisely not the sorts of "abstractions" Barth inveighed 
against; they are the sort of concretions that gave his theology power. They are concrete because 
they press this reality into the strange new world within the bible, because they read everything 
as a type of Christ. To conclude, "theology regularly entails judgments about reality that go 
beyond or otherwise differ from what is 'empirically' available (e.g., human beings are created in 
the image of God)." The charge of going beyond the empirical is hardly to be avoided, short of 
redefining "empirical"; and it is hard to see why theologians should want to avoid it.12  
In what follows, therefore, I do not propose that theology do without judgments that reach 
beyond empirical reality, and I assume with Barth that the "really real" absorbs this world into 
the one depicted in the bible. Nevertheless, I also propose that Barth's readings of Jews and 
gender have room to become more concrete, more absorbed into the biblical text, related to 
Christ in a more complex way, specifically by his people and his Spirit. In particular, I will be 
proposing that Barth's critique of the 19th century insufficiently identified two of its abstractions, 
two of its failures to see reality in the mirror of Christ. It will not have escaped attentive readers 
of Marquardt's list that Barth accuses the Synagogue of being "a living petrification of the Old 
Testament in itself and in abstracto" \ Is it really in accord with Barth's doctrine that the elect 
people can actually succeed in "abstracting" themselves from God's self-determination to be for 
them—or can only theologians do that? 
 
Besides—consideration of the Jews could scarcely count as natural theology, if their community 
is still a concern or a material mode of the Spirit. Either the doctrine of Israel is worse than we 
thought—it is a doctrine that there exists a group of human beings entirely natural, in hyper-
Protestant opposition to grace, entirely God-forsaken and Spirit-bereft—or Barth's pneumatology 
had grown fairly abstract, if he could refrain from protest against a doctrine of Israel 
characterized as natural theology—even as its kernel of truth within the revelation of grace!  
Unintended Abstraction in Earth's Doctrine of Elect Pairs  
Barth reformulates the doctrine of election by taking up all the traditional examples of individual 
elect and rejected human beings and even animals, setting them into pairs, and referring both, the 
elected and the rejected member, to Jesus Christ as their typological reference, since he is elect 
and the rejected human being in one, the rejected human being elected. It is a glorious change of 
subject from the usual elect-and-reprobate division, a brilliant un-asking of the question. All the 
things the orthodox predestinarians said are true, even about reprobation—if only they all apply 
first and para-digmatically not to individual human beings, but to Jesus Christ, and to others only 
"in him" (Eph. 1:4; CD II/2,110-115).  
Thus when Barth finally comes, after some three hundred pages of turning the reader's attention 
to the election of Christ and the community, to "The Elect and the Rejected," there is no change 
of subject. Barth finds pairs of elect and rejected everywhere in the bible, all pointing to the 
rejected one elected, Jesus Christ. There he launches a litany to recover for fiercely christo-
centric usage the older doctrine of twin predestination, or praedestinatio geminai So we hear of 
the following pairs: Cain and Abel, Isaac and Ishmael, Rachel and Leah, Ephraim and Manasseh, 
Tamar and Judah, Perez and Zerah, the offering goat and the scapegoat, the slain bird and the 
released bird, Saul and David, the man of God of Judah and the prophet from Bethel, and finally 
Judas and Paul (CD II/2, 354-409, 458-506). In ringing the changes upon this theme Barth is not 
tone-deaf. The renditions abound in subtlety and depth. The elect and the rejected are allowed to 
intersect and change sides, and both—Saul no less than David—are types of Jesus Christ. In the 
famous long, small-print excursus on Judas (CD 11/2, 458-506), Barth shows Judas as one of the 
elect, the disciples; insists that he has completed the three traditional parts of contrition, contritio 
cordis, confessio oris, satisfactio opens; washes out any distinction between Judas and Peter, 
Judas and any of us, Judas and Paul; before concluding:  
But to say this is to say all that we need to say about the general question of the divine 
will and intention for the rejected, the non-elect. The answer can only be as follows. 
[God] wills that [the non-elect human being] too should hear the Gospel, and with it the 
promise of his election. He wills, then, that this Gospel should be proclaimed to him. He 
wills that he should appropriate and live by the hope which is given him in the Gospel. 
He wills that the rejected should believe, and that as a believer he should become a 
rejected human being elected. The rejected one as such has no independent existence in 
the presence of God. He is not determined by God merely to be rejected. He is 
determined to hear and say that he is a rejected human being elected. This is what the 
elect of the New Testament are—rejected ones elected in and from their rejection, human 
beings in whom Judas lived, but was also slain, as in the case of Paul. They are rejected 
ones who as such are summoned to faith. They are rejected ones who on the basis of the 
election of Jesus Christ, and looking to the fact that He delivered Himself up for them, 
believe in their election. (CD II/2, 506)  
This gives one a taste for rich biblical exegesis, from Cain and Abel to Judas and Paul, and for 
relentless christocentric focus.  
But it can give one a taste for more riches. Christocentrism works well with dialectic. It is good 
at resolving pairs. In spite of great detail, in spite of its ability to adduce figures like Ephraim and 
Manasseh, Perez and Zerah, unknown to most theologians, in spite of its ability to evoke and 
incorporate a huge volume of biblical narrative, it has its limits. It does better with character than 
with plot. It does better with dialectic than with complication. It does better with individuals or 
groups treated individualistically, than with individuals in community. Even as it evokes and 
incorporates biblical narratives as no theologian has done since Luther, it also suppresses and 
flattens parts of them. Its subtlety is dialectical, not plotted; twofold, not circumstantial. It does 
not tell us how to talk about the means by which God works among others—third parties, 
circumstances, communities—to hold up the twinned pairs for display. Think of Rebecca tricking 
Isaac into blessing Jacob, Jonathan allying himself with David, the costuming of Tamar lying in 
wait for Judah, the dozens or thousands who surround and support the pairs. Barth can evoke 
these details—but he cannot exploit them. Or better: he cannot exploit them without referring 
much more often to that Trinitarian person to whom we appropriate the movements of hearts, 
and circumstances, and communities, who blows where it wills, and thus resists reduction into 
twofold categories, however skillfully plied: I mean the Spirit. Barth has whetted appetites for a 
radically theological reading of biblical narrative— whetted it in such a way that we want more. 
More is readily available. It is the overplus that the Spirit supplies, never apart from the Father 
and the Son, but enriching and celebrating them. It is the Spirit to whom we ascribe the plots and 
turns of biblical narrative, the circumstances and communities of biblical characters, the 
secondary causes that move their hearts in this world. Barth is richly open for this sort of 
elaboration, though he does not pursue it. 
The Holy Spirit Can Alleviate the Unintended Abstraction  
The condition for the possibility in God for "Jesus's existence, of the life of our brother-man/' is 
God's life as the One who loves in freedom in se before being that One also for us. It is because 
God loves in freedom already without us that we can know God in Jesus as loving in freedom 
now for us, not capriciously or abstractly but by God's own trinitarian self-determination, 
because God is in se as God does in Jesus; because God's loving in freedom is neither externally 
compelled nor spontaneously arbitrary, yet mysteriously and reliably characteristic. Thus we 
read in the stirring Leitsatz to §32: "The doctrine of election is the sum of the Gospel because of 
all the words that can be said or heard it is the best: that God elects the human being; that God is 
for the human being too the One who loves in freedom" (CD II/2, 3; emphasis added). The 
mystery and reliability of the One who loves in freedom is revealed and enacted and furthered in 
a real history with us human beings in the resurrection of Jesus. God proves free to restore the 
love between the Father and the Son, even in the face of death. Barth stops there—it is enough 
—he has explicated the doctrine of election with the doctrine of atonement. But he might have 
gone further. He might have completed the doctrine of election not only in terms of the Second 
Person but also in terms of the Third.34  
Precisely as God proves free to restore the love between God the Father and God the Son 
identified with sinful human flesh, God is free also to celebrate and glorify and consummate that 
love by catching us up into it. God's loving in freedom is not without celebration, glorification, 
and delight, not without the sort of communal joy that feasts and weddings grant to love. To do 
that is the intratrinitarian role of the Spirit. It is therefore not necessary, but it is both gracious 
and fitting for God to catch us up into it. To do that is the appropriate work of the Spirit (Rom. 
8:11). God the Father is not to be separated from God the Son; classical predestinarians drove in 
a wedge there. And human incorporation into that inseparable relationship is not to be separated 
from the work of the Spirit. Although the solution is resolutely christocentric, Barth does not fail 
to mention the Spirit. God's being as the One who loves in freedom is explicated by the Trinity, 
and election simply describes the turn of the One who loves in freedom toward us human beings 
in Christ not without the Spirit. It is the chief end of the human being, for Barth as for the 
opening answer of the Westminster Confession, "to glorify God and enjoy Him forever," but that 
is what the Spirit does already in the Trinity (§§12, 18).35 So human beings can glorify God 
because in so doing the Holy Spirit catches them up into its proper work of glorifying the love 
between the Father and the Son. As Rowan Williams puts it:  
The whole story of creation, incarnation and our incorporation into the fellowship of Christ's 
body tells us that God desires us, as if we were God, as if we were that unconditional response to 
God's giving that God's self makes in the life of the trinity. We are created so that we may be 
caught up in this; so that we may grow into the wholehearted love of God by learning that God 
loves us as God loves God. The life of the Christian community has as its rationale—if not 
invariably its practical reality— the task of teaching us this ...36  
No work of the triune God can be without the celebration and witness of the Spirit, since then the 
love of the Father and the Son would be isolated, lonely, lacking in the richness that the parables 
of Jesus portray, like a wedding without a celebration, a marriage without a witness, a feast 
without a guest.37 Nothing requires that human beings celebrate the wedding, witness the 
marriage, enjoy the feast; in the Spirit God enjoys all those things, already rich.38 But by the 
same Spirit it is not foreign to God, but characteristic of God—particularly characteristic of this 
God, the one who is not without the Spirit—to catch us up into those things.  
Thus election too cannot be without the Spirit, even if Barth chooses to emphasize the role of the 
Son. Election too is for something, for the triune life that the Spirit prepares and fulfills us to 
share. The trinitarian explications of particularity may remain formulaic compared to the 
christological ones that subdivide them, but they leave open room for additional explications, 
just as Barthian, and necessarily so.  
Robert Jenson has seen this openness in Barth and proposed, not as a replacement of Barth's 
discovery that Jesus Christ is the electing God, but as its necessary complement: The Holy Spirit 
is the electing God.39 What would that mean for Barth's biblical exegesis, especially the exegesis 
of all those typed pairs?  
It would mean a greater openness to the complications and details of the stories, the ways in 
which the Spirit moves not just pairs of people, but the communities and environments around 
them, to construct typological relationships, so that supporting actors and circumstances and 
growth and reversal and plot come into play—or, to put it into more theological language, so that 
one attends more to community or church and providence and sanctification and resurrection, not 
just "the rejected" and "the elect." The bible knows lots of detail and lots of characters and lots of 
complication that praedestinatio gemina washes out. I am not proposing to give up the 
typological majesty of Cain and Abel, sacrifice and scapegoat, Sarah and Hagar, Jacob and Esau, 
Leah and Rachel, David and Saul, Judas and Paul. But I am proposing that a reference to the 
Spirit helps us to complicate the typology in a way at once more biblical, more communitarian or 
ecclesial, and more trinitarian in execution as well as in program. When Barth neglects Spirit to 
concentrate on the christological references of praedestinatio gemina, he neglects Rebecca and 
Laban and Jonathan and sheers the biblical stories of half their characters and most of their 
circumstances, the Spirit's painful, complex work. The Spirit works among details and diversity 
in which Barth's pairs stand out in relief: but they do not so stand without the Spirit, and greater 
attention to the Spirit can restore theological readings of such stories, precisely in a Barthian 
mode, but ever new, to more biblical detail. It comes not amiss if the Spirit should use 
circumstances of farmers and herders to illuminate Cain and Abel; if sacrifice and scapegoat 
should be part of a richer communal and ritual life; if Abraham should belong to Sarah and 
Keturah and Hagar; if Rebecca should become the means for Jacob's receiving the promised 
blessing over Esau; if Laban should manipulate Leah and Rachel; if Jonathan should transfer 
kingship from Saul to David; and if Matthias should recede into obscurity to allow Paul to 
become the effective replacement for Judas.  
We may sum up like this. Barth did not abhor abstraction for its own sake. Barth abhorred it just 
as it impugned the character of the One who loves in freedom as revealed in Jesus Christ. The 
Father's freedom may not be compromised by a love without reception and response. That is true 
both antecedently in se, as the Father loves the Son, and also for us, in the Son's appropriated 
work of reconciling us by atonement to share in their love (§§11, 13, 33). Such an abstraction 
would finally amount to the heresy that Jesus is not the Lord.  
The same move is inalienable from the Spirit. The Father and the Son may not be abstracted 
from Spirit; their love may not go unwitnessed, unblessed, uncelebrated, undelighted in. So too 
the being of the One who loves in freedom may not be abstracted from that One's gracious self-
determination to be the One who loves in freedom by freeing for love.40 That is true both 
antecedently in se, as the Spirit liberates the love of the Father and the Son for fruitfulness and 
joy, and also for us, in the Spirit's appropriated work of liberating us by sanctification and 
gathering to share in their fruitfulness and joy (§§12, 67, 68).41 Such an abstraction can tend 
toward the heresy that the Spirit is not the Lord.  
George Hunsinger has written:  
It would be abstract in Barth's sense to speak of the Father and the Son in separation from 
the Holy Spirit. Whether Barth is actually guilty of such an abstraction is, I think, 
difficult to say. Merely to leave the work of the Holy Spirit implicit or undiscussed is not 
necessarily to be guilty of abstraction, though it may make Barth guilty of neglect. To 
make him guilty of abstraction on this score, one would need to show that discussing the 
work of the Holy Spirit more explicitly (in a way that Barth could accept, assuming that 
one is still striving for an internal critique) would somehow radically alter or supplement 
what Barth does manage to say.42  
The supplements would be: to speak of God's self-determination in covenant with Israel as 
seriously as God's self-determination in covenant with Jesus Christ, not on a two-covenants 
theory, but on a one-covenant theory where the gap is stressed between the cause of the covenant 
in Christ's atoning work, and the guarantee of the covenant to Israel in the promise to Abraham.43 
And to deploy anagogy as seriously as typology.  
Unintended Abstraction in Earth's Doctrine of Israel  
Barth's §34, "The Election of the Community," is remarkable for explaining to Protestants—and 
to a lesser extent to Christians generally—what Jews have never forgotten and what Christians 
should have been unable to miss: most of the election talk in the bible is about an elect 
community?44 Undergraduates typically suppose that "chosenness" (used of Israel) and 
"predestination" (used of individuals) are two separate things—and students are not so culpable 
in that supposition: generations of Christian theologians have taught and stupefied them with it. 
Furthermore, Barth insists with Romans 11, but against much of the Christian tradition and the 
particular anti-Semitism of the Nazis, that the election of Israel is secure. The Church and Israel 
comprise one elect community, the environment of the Messiah. Barth is the father of many late-
twentieth century doctrines of Israel that improve on him (Klappert, Marquardt, Wyschogrod), 
yet continues to be more important than they. Even though the polemic against abstraction 
continues into §34, abstraction returns with alternately renewed and mitigated virulence in "The 
Election of the Community." Instead of the unknown human being, elect and rejected, we get an 
unknown human community, the human being in its "passing and coming" form. We get again 
an unknown God in Barth, too, one who can change his mind on us, making a covenant that 
supersedes the old. It is another Deus absconditus, a God who has absconded from the covenant 
at Sinai. For according to Barth, although God honors Jews, God no longer honors Judaism.  
To be sure, Barth thinks he has avoided the abstraction of the human being. Barth means Israel, 
not as an abstraction but as a biblical and christo-logical concretion of the human being in its 
passing form. Barth means the church, not as an abstraction but as a biblical and christological 
concretion of the human being in its coming form. Both of those communities, furthermore, are 
empirically identifiable. And both of them, as before, are types of Jesus Christ, who passes 
through death and comes again. Furthermore, Barth is not supersessionist in one sense, because 
he upholds the covenant with Abraham.  
We should be suspicious of that defense because Calvin (say) might have defended himself 
similarly on the doctrine that Barth marshals the critique of abstraction to demolish. Calvin 
might also have said that the human being in its rejected form is represented by the unregenerate, 
in its elect form by the true church. In spite of disclaimers in his better moments, Calvin too at 
least sometimes thought the groups empirically identifiable, and he would certainly have had no 
trouble seeing them as representative of biblical types. Therefore, the classical doctrine too, 
Calvin might complain, was sufficiently "concrete." What Calvin would not be able to claim is 
that the doctrine sufficiently protects concreteness in the sense of Jesus Christ as the elect one.  
What Barth is not able to claim is similar: that the doctrine of the election of the community 
sufficiently protects concreteness in the sense of the Holy Spirit as the electing God and the 
immanent electedness of human communities, or immanent in the Church.45 And precisely 
because it is communities we are talking about here, one would expect Barth to talk about the 
Holy Spirit as the one to whom we appropriate their gathering, upbuilding, and holiness, as 
elsewhere he does, and does at length. But not here. As Barth is less able to particularize the 
community by reference to the Spirit's work, so he is less able to identify God by the Spirit's 
work.  
What does it mean to identify God by the Spirit's work? Two things.  
1. It means to identify God by God's self-commitment in covenant not, this time, to the human 
being in Jesus Christ, but to the human community in Israel. More broadly, the promise to 
Abraham was that he would be a father of many nations, by which they would bless themselves, 
by which, that is, they would become for one another a source not of hostility but of mutual 
blessing.46  
2. It means, second, to identify God by scriptural exegesis not, this time, typologically focused 
on Jesus Christ, but anagogically focused on the perfect community, the heavenly Jerusalem, the 
consummation for which Christians daily pray, "thy kingdom come." To identify God by Jesus 
Christ is to refuse abstraction from God's concrete self-determination to be for human beings in 
him, and thus to practice typological exegesis. To identify God by the Holy Spirit is to refuse 
abstraction from God's concrete self-determination to be for Israel, and thus to practice 
anagogical exegesis.  
It is Robert Jenson who has suggested that to identify God by the Spirit's work is to identify God 
by the Spirit's agency in the church; but "the personal agent of this work in fact turns out at every 
step of Barth's argument to be not the Spirit, as advertised, but Christ; the Spirit is denoted 
invariably by impersonal terms. The Spirit is 'the power of Jesus Christ's being.'"47 The Spirit is 
God's power, but not God's act. The sheer potential here echoes the sheer potential of the Father 
in Reformation doctrines of election, with similar abstraction. The abstract human being that 
Barth denied was unrelated to God, was not christologically defined, was indeed god-forsaken, in 
that God had no prior commitment to that human being, or better, no prior commitment of God's 
own to that human being, so that God was "free" to exercise caprice. God's "relation" to the 
human being was not personal, but potential; it was a matter of abstract power.  
If the abstraction here of Father and Son from the Spirit is similar to the abstraction there of 
Father from Son, then we can have all sorts of talk of the Spirit that proves ineffective, as earlier 
accounts of election made Christ not the concretely elected God and elected human being in one, 
but the much-discussed instrument of the Father's caprice. Similarly, we should expect to find a 
community abstracted from the Spirit, as before we found a human being abstracted from the 
Son.  
An abstraction of the Spirit would be similar. God's "relation" to the human community is not 
personal, but potential; it is a matter of abstract power. The "power" even "of Jesus Christ" is still 
an abstraction if not bound to "the act of a particular community." In this case, for Barth, God 
has a future relation to Israel, but Israel is not identifiable, since God has (for Barth) no future 
relation to the material community of the Synagogue.48 It is "the Old Testament in abstracto" for 
Barth, the "passing" form of the human being. It is, for Barth, what Jews need to be saved from. 
Precisely to the extent that Barth's "Synagogue" is that which human beings are saved from, it is 
Spirit-bereft, just as the rejected in the Reformed system were Christ-bereft. Barth does not say 
that the Spirit has ignored the Jews, to be sure. He includes them into the community of Jews and 
Gentiles which is the church, humanity's coming form. Yet precisely that leaves the Synagogue 
an abstract absence of good, an abstract Spirit-less-ness, as the rejected were an abstract Christ-
less-ness. Despite all disclaimers, that seems to be the logic of the matter, despite so many 
epicycles and protests. And yet if God knows the human being only in Christ, Barth complained, 
there is really no such thing as a Christ-less human being. Is there no such thing as a Spirit-less 
human community?  
God is free to keep faith with Jews, because the eschatological community will consist of Jews 
and Gentiles. But Barth's identification of Jews who continue to act identifiably as Jews, who 
concretely keep faith with God's self-commitment to them, as humanity's "passing form" does 
not easily express the concreteness of that freedom. Soulen uses the phrase "Israel-
forgetfulness": it means that God's history with Jesus so overwhelms God's history with Israel, 
that the latter becomes indecisive for God's identity.49 One would not normally say that Barth's 
theology suffers from Israel-forgetfulness. But does Israel's history continue to be decisive for 
the identity of God, if Israel ceases to live a life of its own, coming merely to represent or to 
mirror, in the terms of a German Idealism that Barth otherwise eschewed, humanity's "passing" 
form? Barth's Israel-anthropology sounds less general than Schleiermacher's, because it seems to 
be a biblical rather than an Enlightenment anthropology.50 But is it really? Is the Holy Spirit, the 
bond of fidelity between Father and Son, still free to keep faith with circumcision? Is the Holy 
Spirit, the bond of community within the Trinity, still free to build community with the God of 
Israel at Passover? If not, does God not pass over the community to which God was bound and 
abandon it (for reasons of sin) just as the Reformers' God passed over and abandoned the abstract 
human rejected (for reasons of sin)? If Israel's history is humanity's passing form, does it not 
become something human beings are saved from, rather than the bearer of the consummation that 
human beings are saved for?51 
"Its mission as a natural community has now run its course and cannot be continued."52 If there 
should be no abstract piling up of sin upon the rejected human being, then should there be an 
abstract piling up of sin upon the rejected community, humanity's passing form? The continuing 
existence of Jews is emphatically God-willed for Barth, but not the continuing existence of the 
practices that constitute and build up and set apart the community that alone makes Jews 
concretely identifiable, the community of Judaism.  
The Spirit is able to keep faith with God's covenants. God is able to be constant. God past and 
present are creatively the same. The Spirit who frees God to be creatively and livingly the One 
God, the Spirit who guarantees the unity of God, the Spirit who reunited the Father and the Son 
at the resurrection, still keeps faith. God's very unity is confirmed in the face of threat, as the 
Spirit confirmed it after one of the Persons suffered death on the cross. A God who cannot keep 
faith is just as much an unknown God as one who makes arbitrary decisions; a God who keeps 
faith with a covenant community is concrete in the fidelity of the Spirit. "The gospel's reliability 
among the Jews is the precondition of its identifiability among the Greeks."53  
Those are things Barth would like to say—and does say. "It is not any other people, nor the 
totality of others, but the Jews who are the universal horizon of each and all peoples."54 The 
question is whether the language of humankind's "passing form" and the relative absence of 
Spirit-talk allow him to do so as effectively as possible.  
The Holy Spirit Supplements Earth's Doctrine of Israel, Because Consummation is Especially 
Appropriate to the Spirit  
In her marvelous book, That Jesus Christ Was Born a Jew: Karl Barth's Doctrine of Israel, 
Katherine Sonderegger argues that the problem in Barth's doctrine of the elect community is that 
he conceives it on the pattern of justification.55 One community must represent the sinner, the 
other the righteous; the combined community of God, the environment of Jesus Christ, 
represents the sinner justified, as he does. The sinner is the passing, the justified one the coming 
human being. Israel represents sin, the Church redemption. But such a canonical construal 
remains pneumatologically abstract, no matter how many supporting details one adduces.  
According to George Lindbeck, the biblical witness is that the Church and Israel are types, but 
not of Christ: they are types (anagogues) of the people of God in fellowship with God at the end 
of time.56 If Barth were still alive, and now had time for the Jews, he could notice the amazing 
(or perhaps not so amazing) thing that Jewish theologians can have the same eschatology as 
Paul: at the end, when the Messiah comes, the Gentiles will become part of the people of God 
without having to observe Torah. (So Novak in The Election of Israel) Lindbeck suggests that 
the two become compatible even about "when the Messiah comes", if we recall that for 
Christians the Messiah comes twice57—or if, as Stan Stowers suggests as a reading of Romans, 
the one mission of the Messiah is split into two moments for the salvation of the world.58 In any 
case, the type of the people of God that both Israel and the Church indubitably represent 
(however they relate to Christ) is most easily appropriated to the concreteness of the Spirit. The 
gathering and setting apart and consummation of the community is the work of the triune God 
appropriated to the Spirit.  
Furthermore, precisely the continued God-willed distinction of Gentile Christians and Jews that 
Barth favors might lead one to this observation: that while God's history with the nations is 
easily parsed as a type of redemption— since God so graciously and surprisingly includes them 
in the one covenant with Abraham—God's biblically recorded history with Israel is less so. For 
Gentiles, the main plot of the biblical story is redemption, with consummation as an unexpected 
further benefit59: so the Paschal benediction in the Roman order: felix culpa, quae tantum ac 
talent meruit habere Redemptorem!60 But for Jews the main plot of the biblical story is about the 
community and the promises made to it; that those promises will also be kept in the face of sin is 
a corollary and subplot to the main movement. The doubt is never, in Judaism, about whether 
God will abandon them in anger over sin; doubt is rather about whether God will keep faith in 
the face of enemies and difficulties, from Babylon to the Holocaust, and Jews are so bold, in the 
Psalms, as simply to hold God to account for those promises.61 For Gentiles, redemption is the 
plot, consummation the denouement; for Jews consummation is the main plot, redemption the 
subplot, the outcome of which is never in real doubt. So redemption is the wrong main model for 
the election of Israel, but consummation is. So too consummation belongs to the work we 
appropriate to the Spirit: the work of glorifying and celebrating the goodness of God, as Jews 
teach Christians to do, and by which Christians believe we are ourselves caught up into the 
Spirit's office of doing that also within the trinitarian communion. They are not two stories, much 
less two covenants, but two ways the Spirit excites gratitude for the blessings of Abraham in the 
readers of the bible, who in this too can become sources of mutual blessing one for the other.  
To use the words in their narrower senses, this means too that Barth's exegesis needs 
supplementation with pneumatologically concrete forms in addition to typology, where 
"typology" means to take biblical and extra-biblical events in reference specifically to Christ. 
That is to admit that there is something a little funny about talking of a typology of the Spirit. 
But to say that Israel and the Church are types of the community of God in the world to come, 
and to say that the main plot of God's story with Israel is one of consummation, into which, as 
subplot, the Gentiles get eschatologically engrafted by redemption, is to talk about an exegetical 
procedure forgotten in Protestantism, even by Barth, except among the traditionally black 
churches: that of anagogy. 
Barth's critique of prior theology, especially of the Reformation, proceeded by recovering a pre-
critical mode of exegesis that related biblical and extra-biblical figures to Christ, namely 
typology. Barth might have recovered another, distinct pre-critical mode of exegesis for relating 
Biblical and extra-Biblical realities to their existence in and before the triune God. There are 
more ways of being trinitarianly concrete than typology. Classically, anagogy related realities on 
earth to realities in heaven, the church militant to the church triumphant. Like pneumatology, 
anagogy does not solve problems straightforwardly. Earlier anagogical exegesis was shot 
through with anti-Judaism. But it provides a fitting arena for die Anstrengung des Begriffs. It can 
improve upon typology for the concrete representation of Jews and gender in theology for three 
reasons.  
1. Typology typically relates individual figures to Christ; anagogy typically relates groups on 
earth to groups in heaven; although theology does need to speak of Adam and Israel as concrete 
types of Christ, it needs additionally to acknowledge women, men, and Jews as concrete groups. 
Speaking of women and men as anagogically concrete will differ from treating them as statistical 
cohorts; men can participate in female anagogues, such as the church, and women can participate 
in male anagogues, such as Christ.  
2. Typology tends to relate individual figures to Christ's work as accomplished once and for all; 
anagogy supplements typology by relating groups to the Holy Spirit's work as ongoing; and 
therefore anagogy is particularly appropriate when the churches wonder whether the Spirit is 
trying to stir them further with respect to women or Jews.  
3. Typology belongs especially to the order of redemption, but anagogy especially to the order of 
consummation; therefore, anagogy is particularly appropriate in reading Jews and Gentiles as 
somehow both heirs to the one covenant with Abraham that through him all the nations of the 
earth would bless themselves, or in reading women and men in terms of the wedding of the lamb: 
because both those images are eschatological images, images of a consummation in which 
human beings, especially in the groups now marked by hostility, actually become the occasions 
of mutual blessing that God is in the life of the Trinity, and so come finally to share in the 
trinitarian life, participants by the Spirit of adoption in the divine nature.  
To affirm, furthermore, that prophetic words are anagogues of the last judgment—which is 
clearly the case in most New Testament prophecy, such as the synoptic apocalypse in Mark 13 
and parallels, and in Revelation—is also to contextualize (if not deny) Barth's notion that they 
are types of the crucifixion, and therefore of God's justification of sinners in Christ's atoning 
work. As anagogues of God's judgment, they belong rather to God's call of sinners into a holy 
community with God, a heavenly city, a new Jerusalem. The "new Jerusalem," anagogical 
language par excellence, confirms the role of Israel in prefiguring the consummation of God with 
us. But that is what Barth would call the coming human being, not the passing one: his 
identification of Israel with the passing form has rendered him tone deaf about how Israel still 
has something that the Church needs.  
What Jews have that Christians lack is a straightforward although not uncomplicated relation to 
God in the covenant, so that as Barth insisted they are "all of them by nature sanctified by Him, 
sanctified as ancestors and kin of the Holy One in Israel, in a sense that Gentiles are not by 
nature" (CD II/2, 287). Barth could do that insight more justice. The language of the passing 
form obscures it. Barth might have learned from Rosenzweig too that "luáaios nascitur, 
Christianus fit," or to put it in Pauline language, that Jews are "naturally" children of God, and 
Gentiles are made children of God by adoption, or, more strikingly, "contrary to nature" (para 
phusin, Rom. 11:24), by engrafting. Now that most Christians are Gentiles, Barth might have 
supposed that until the eschaton the Holy Spirit is keeping identifiable Jews apart from the 
Christian community so that they will not be swallowed up in Gentileness—and so that, more 
important, Gentile Christians will learn that they are Goyim.62 Almost all Christians—Gentile 
ones—need to learn that life with God is not their due reward, not their natural possession, not 
theirs to demand or extort, and they can learn that perhaps best by learning that others have a 
prior claim, others are God's first love,63 others have become (also by grace) God's quasi natural 
family. Almost all Christians need to learn to see themselves as Gentiles whose baptism washes 
away their lack of relation to the promises of Israel.64 They do not need to learn to see Jews as 
disobedient proto-Christians. If the Jews, as Barth sees, are the "horizon" of the Gentiles, and if 
the Gentiles, therefore, are defined in terms of their lack over against the Jews, then Barth might 
have spoken of the Jews, too, as humanity's coming form. That Barth does speak that way of 
Jewish Christians does not succeed in teaching the vast majority of Christians who are Gentiles 
that Gentileness, originally marked by idol worship and a lack of relationship with the God of 
Israel, is also humanity's passing form. What passes away for Gentiles is God's continuing threat 
to cut off again the engrafted branches (Rom. 11:22). What comes is unended life with the God 
of Israel. The doctrine of election is the sum of the gospel precisely if it teaches us this: that the 
God of Israel is for the Gentile too the One who loves in freedom.  
The eschatological community where Christians learn to see themselves as possessing no God of 
their own, but as brought by sheer grace into the worship of the God of the Jews,65 would lead to 
a doctrine of the election of the community to which the Holy Spirit calls us. Unlike most 
Protestants, Barth has a rich doctrine of vocation, which Catholics might call glorification or 
Orthodox deification. He might have built his doctrine of election on that model. Nevertheless, 
there is one passage in which he glimpses the possibility, one passage in which he sees that the 
problem for overwhelmingly Gentile Christians is less the justification of the Jews, than the 
vocation of the Gentiles. The reversal is typically Barthian. Would that it had come sooner. In 
commenting on the unity of the community of God, Barth adverts, as we have seen, to the unity 
to which the Spirit calls it:  
[The Church] must call [the Synagogue] by joining with it as [the Messiah's] people, and 
therefore with Him. No particular function can be this call, but only the life of the 
community as a whole authentically lived before the Jews. It need hardly be said that the 
life of the community as a whole neither has been nor is this call.... [The Church] has 
debated with [the Jew], tolerated him, persecuted him, or abandoned him to persecution 
without protest.... The recurrent Jewish question is the question of Christ and the 
Church.... (CD IV/3/2, 878)  
The whole doctrine of election needs to be recast on that basis. Persecution too belongs to 
humanity's passing form, and not because it is Jewish! Two features of the passage call for 
comment.  
On the one hand, it would make a much more promising start for the doctrine of the election of 
the community than the one that Barth in fact adopts, open as it is to vocation and thus, 
implicitly, to Spirit and anagogy, and willing, by the end, to raise the Christian question, the 
Church question. Under that rubric much of the doctrine of justification could still be mined, 
only explicitly this time as the question of "the life of the community before the Jews." That puts 
Jews in the position of judging, which does not avoid but revitalizes Barth's use of christocentric 
typology. Seeing the Jews as judges is both typologically and anagogically apt. Christians might 
then tremble before the prospect that Jesus Christ was not only "born" a Jew.  
Beside the implicit notion that Jews judge the church, on the other hand, stands the explicit 
notion that the Church calls "the Jew." Barth has still to state what the logic of his paragraph 
implies, that the Holy Spirit calls the Church, and that their work cannot be identified precisely 
when the Church stands under the judgment of another, or when one part of the community of 
God, the mostly Gentile Christian part, stands under the judgment of the Messiah for its sins 
against another part of the community of God, the Jewish part. On Barth's own grounds the call 
of the Spirit ought not to be identified with that of the community, when the community itself 
lacks the marks of the Spirit in justice and unity. When the Church finally calls "the Jew," it will 
be the last judge who comes.  
Now I turn to a second and parallel case of Barth's erecting a screen on which he can project an 
abstraction and conceal multiple particulars, all because it is a screen that attempts to prevent the 
Holy Spirit from blowing where it will—especially from the other side of the screen.  
Unintended Abstraction in Barth's Doctrine of Co-humanity  
Barth's exegesis of the image of God in the human being as explicated by a man-woman pair 
occurs in §41.2-3 (CD III/l, 94-329). The section as a whole is very beautiful: Creation is the 
external basis of the covenant, the covenant the internal basis of creation. Nothing is wrong with 
analogizing the marriage covenant with the divine-human covenant. The one flesh, says Barth, 
"has its frontiers in a very different beginning and end, where Yahweh and His people are 
together ... One flesh'" (CD III/l, 315). Similarly, "Love and marriage ... become to them in some 
sense irresistibly a parable and sign of the link which Yahweh has established between Himself 
and His people, which in His eternal faithfulness He has determined to keep, and which He for 
His part has continually renewed" (CD III/l, 315). And the analogy goes in the right direction: 
God's love and primary analogate, human love the secondary: "Because the election of God is 
real, there is such a thing as love and marriage" (CD III/l, 318). But Barth overstates the case. So 
we get assertions like this: "Man is no longer single but a couple" (CD III/l, 308). "As there is no 
abstract manhood, there is no abstract womanhood. The only real humanity is that which for the 
woman consists in being the wife of a male and therefore the wife of man" (CD III/l, 309). 
Furthermore, the duality is "unequal" (CD III/l, 288) and in an order in which man is A and 
woman Β (CD III/4,168ff.).  
Barth's use of I-Thou categories begins at CD III/4, 290 and appears again in §45, the Leitsatz for 
which reads, "creaturely being is a being in encounter—between I and Thou, man and woman" 
(CD III/2, 203; esp. also 244-274). That I-Thou categories are made for projection Barth had 
certainly learned from Feuerbach's use of them to argue that the divine Thou is just a projection 
of human need; they form a recurrent theme of Feuerbach's The Essence of Christianity, 
analyzed in Barth's introduction.66 It should come as no surprise, then, if Barth resists projecting 
the desire of man onto God, only to project the desire of man onto woman, in calling "wirklich" 
an Edenic man-woman pair that Genesis refrains from portraying in act. Barth takes what is 
essentially a phenomenological category, which in Buber's version can support an I-Thou 
encounter with a tree,67 and uses it to express, import, or smuggle in a paradigm. Man and 
woman do not relate as I and Thou phenomenologically; they relate as a model of co-humanity, 
its "basic form" (§45.2, esp. CD II/2,250-274). "Being in encounter is (1) a being in which one 
human being looks the other in the eye" (CD III/2,250). "Being in encounter consists (2) in the 
fact that there is mutual speech and hearing" (252, my italics). "Being an encounter consists (3) 
in that we render mutual assistance in the act of being" (260, my italics). "But being in encounter 
consists (4) in the fact that all the occurrence which we have so far described as the basic form of 
humanity stands under the sign that it is done on both sides with gladness" (265). One may have 
no quarrel with those theses and yet observe that (1) they end up treating the I-Thou encounter, 
whether intentionally or surreptitiously, as if it led to a model "relationship" and (2) Adam and 
Eve do not, in fact, act in Genesis as those in a model relationship—although others in the bible 
may come closer. Adam and Eve experience their failure under precisely the categories in which 
Barth projects their unrecorded success—a projection, despite attempts and disclaimers aimed at 
"Wirklichkeit," that proves almost as romantic as similar projections in Goethe or Schleiermacher 
or Feuerbach—precisely in their looking each other in the eye, in their mutual speaking and 
hearing, in their mutual assistance, and in their gladness. It is precisely in those respects that, 
according to the Bible, they fail as soon as they act.  
In giving woman a constitutive, structural role in the human creature rather than seeing her as, 
say, a defective man, Barth did better than predecessors with whom he was in conversation, and 
even his refusal to explicate man-woman in terms of strength-weakness looks less as if he is 
dignifying that explanation by mentioning it, than that he is countering ideas all too current in 
1940s Switzerland.  
I pass over much that is good and innovative in §45 of the Dogmatics—like Barth's decision to 
treat our humanity as something ontologically good from which sin cannot alienate us, or the 
decision to relate creation as outer to covenant as inner ground so that the two resist any attempt 
to separate them. Rather I go on here to pursue questions raised by Barth's own best lights. I look 
at biblical narratives that appear to provide richer resources for what Barth treats in §45 and that 
might well have led him to modify his views.  
Despite the distinctions assayed in §45.1, "Jesus, Human Being for Other Human Beings," in 
§45.2, "The Basic Form of Humanity," Barth wanders from the christocentric focus on which in 
§43 he had set his gaze. §45.1 does do the service of reversing Feuerbach's thesis that God is the 
human being in a loud voice; rather God is the human being in Jesus concretely. But §45.2, 
despite disclaimers (222-228), leaves Jesus out of the "basic form." That much shows up already 
in the boldface thesis statements or Leitsätze of the two sections:  
[§43] As the human creature [der Mensch] Jesus is Himself the revealing Word of God, He is the 
source of our knowledge of the nature of the human creature as created by God.  
[§45] That the real human creature [der wirkliche Mensch] is determined by God for life with 
God has its inviolable correspondence in the fact that its creaturely being is a being in 
encounter—between I and Thou, man and woman. It is human in this encounter, and in this 
humanity it is a likeness of the being of its Creator and a being in hope in Him.  
A number of gaps open up in Barth's exposition. Not that we expect him to deduce the nature of 
the human creature simply from the humanity of God in Jesus Christ: that possibility he has 
already excluded. Nor that we could deny him a priori the use of I-Thou or even man-woman 
categories. They have their proper use and service. Rather, more modest questions arise. 
1. As dualistic, I-Thou categories fall short prima facie of likeness to the triunity of the creator. 
They pay too little attention to the work of the Holy Spirit, not easily reducible as a Thou, or 
even, as Barth might have learned from Schleiermacher, to the social character of God's 
relationships with God's creatures in Israel and the Church. Despite the suggestive bridal 
imagery, which serves another purpose, God's relationship to Israel and the Church resists 
reduction to I-Thou (in the singular) but may resemble I-Ye (in the plural). Otherwise the God-
given and Spirit-consummated particularity of the biblical and post-biblical saints gets washed 
out. That modification would open the way for Barth to set communal, ecclesial, and anagogical 
rather than the surreptitiously or openly phenomenological categories of I-Thou to work. Jesus 
worked not only one-on-one but often, perhaps even primarily with groups—the disciples, the 
crowds, the children. In the healings, one gets as close as may be to an authentically biblical 
approach to the "looking in the eye" and the "speaking and hearkening" under which Barth seeks 
to describe the relationship of an I and a Thou, but even there the approach to the I-Thou 
category is reductive: they always take place in and for the benefit also of a larger group. The I-
Thou phenomenology tends to reduce co-humanity to co-individuality and wash out the ecclesial 
nature of the biblical healing stories, which appears signally in the story of the paralytic lowered 
through the roof. He gets healed and has his sins forgiven on account of the faith of others: "And 
when Jesus saw their faith, he said to the paralytic, 'My child, your sins are forgiven'" (Mk. 2:5, 
my italics). Among New Testament illustrations of those relationships, Barth might have noticed 
that I-Thou categories systematically hide the presence of third parties and ecclesial mediation: 
disciples, crowds, friends. The sick are always being brought or even recommended from a 
distance to Jesus by mediating others. This is the sort of work that trinitarian thinking 
appropriates to the Spirit. Christ promises to be with human beings not each individually that we 
might meet him as I and Thou, but when two or three are already gathered in his name. Thus the 
first gap: the I-Thou phenomenology of Barth's anthropology stands in great potential tension 
with his commitments to bible, trinity, and church.  
2. The gap between an I-Thou form and its male-female instantiation yawns particularly wide 
because it reduces, perhaps even resists the pattern of I-Thou relationships that the bible in both 
the Old Testament and the New typically holds out to us. Of course, the I-Thou category serves 
not only to counter individualistic definition of the human creature that infect the Enlightenment 
generally and reach their reductio ad absurdum in Nietzsche's Zarathustra, but also to exclude 
them in advance. And the man-woman division makes an elegant strong reading of the Genesis 
passage, taking seriously God's observation that Adam should not be alone. It proceeds, 
however—in rather too much faith, hope, and charity—to overlook the possibility that Adam and 
Eve, as soon as Genesis shows them acting and therefore being concretely, each treat the other 
less as Thou than as It. 
In Gen. 1:26-29 God makes Adam, male and female, in God's image and gives them dominion 
over the rest of creation. From that passage we cannot determine whether woman and man 
correspond to God's image separately or together. For as soon as they act, they sin. Their 
"concrete" relation does not tell us about the Unfällen image. They may bear the image 
complementarity or distributively; no unsinful action tells us. To discover how the image 
actually works, Barth would say, we must turn to Jesus Christ. But his example would hardly 
lead us to the conclusion that the co-humanity he exemplifies takes man-woman pairs as 
paradigm cases of I and Thou. If so, then Jesus shows us a deficient case of the image, not its 
fullness—which is absurd. That point holds even if one argues that it was Jesus's peculiar 
vocation that prevented him from marrying. The absurd conclusion would still follow that if it 
takes a man-woman pair to exhibit the fullness of the image, then Jesus, precisely because of his 
vocation, provides a deficient case of the image he came to renew. Then Jesus is a failure, not a 
savior.  
In Genesis 2:6-8 and 15-25 we find nothing to indicate that an I-Thou relationship, if it exists, 
has anything to do with their sex. In 2:18 we learn that Adam needs a helper; in 2:24 that a 
husband and wife become one flesh; in 2:25 that the man and the woman were not ashamed. As 
soon as the man and the woman begin to interact they support each other in disobedience and 
deceit. Indeed, the man and the woman as interacting partners do nothing—nothing at all—until 
Genesis 3. What the man says in recognition of the woman while she still lies there does not 
count as the sort of interaction Barth needs. In reading Genesis 2 apart from Genesis 3, Barth 
removes being from history, just as he removes Israel from history. Furthermore, Barth misses 
the irony that accrues to Genesis 2 in Genesis 3.68 "One flesh" turns out, ironically enough, to 
suffer the gloss, "eating the same fruit." Being a "fit helper" turns out to mean that Eve bears the 
blame that also belongs to Adam. "Not being ashamed" turns out to mean having eyes still 
closed. This is not the Gnostic reading that the fall was a good thing. It is the claim that Barth has 
missed the writer's or redactor's sense of irony and humor. The shared flesh the text names 
becomes that of the shared fruit. The helper becomes an accomplice. Their innocence gets 
explicated as closed eyes. These observations of the text do not denigrate the Edenic state, but 
they distance us from it with humor. Humor and irony depend upon distance and time and 
reflect, therefore, the work of the Spirit in bringing resurrection from death, good from evil, 
comedy from tragedy. But humor, and the Spirit, not represented in the dyad, are what Barth has 
missed in the story.  
It is Barth's own emphasis on the phenomenology of "speaking and listening" and "looking the 
other in the eye" and of history (Geschichte) as an explication of being that alert us to these 
things. If Barth had turned to the concrete, biblical narratives (Geschichten) of human speaking 
and listening and of looking the other in the eye, instead of deploying them as the formal 
abstractions that he elsewhere deplores, he might have noticed that the very account he takes as 
paradigm for the I-Thou structure of actual human being employs them to mark it not as real 
(wirklich) but precisely as fallen. Granted, Barth like Thomas knows the value of ideal 
counterfactuals in theology; a prelapsarian analysis is licit and useful—but precisely not where 
the tools of analysis are rubrics like speaking and listening, looking each other in the eye—that 
the biblical Geschichte itself reserves for another, later, ironic purpose, the display of the 
posflapsarian state. For the first conversation that Genesis records takes place between Eve and 
the serpent, and the first possibility it records of man's and woman's openly looking each other in 
the eye comes only after they have eaten the fruit and results immediately in their sewing aprons 
together.  
Thus Genesis 2 offers only empty forms (being abstracted from history) and Genesis 3 fills them 
only with ironic content (history separated from true being by sin), as Genesis uses the I-Thou 
categories that Barth suggests. Before the fall we have no history between Adam and Eve to tell 
us whether and how I-Thou categories apply; after the fall we have evidence only that they treat 
each other as Its. Even before the fall we ought to be suspicious; I-Thou categories imply that 
Adam and Eve are alone with each other, an isolated dyad, whereas in the story they 
emphatically are not. God the Spirit that broods over creation and brings it to consummation is 
walking in the Garden, and I-Thou categories crowd the Spirit out. Therefore, the creation story 
offers only superficial and ironizing support for the explication of I and Thou in terms of man 
and woman as such. Barth would have done better to follow his own advice and see the 
possibility of I-Thou not in the duality of the sexes but as the condition for the variety of 
relationships that Jesus Christ made concrete in New Testament story and Old Testament 
reference, relationships that are explicitly surrounded by a community and filled with the Spirit, 
and therefore resist dyadic reduction. Barth might have seen a foreshadowing of co-humanity in 
community and Spirit in the creation of the two, without turning male and female into 
ontological categories that make the humanity of Jesus deficient. The fact that Jesus is also God, 
or that for Barth we do not so much imitate as follow him at a distance, or that Jesus serves 
typologically as bridegroom of the Church do not grant him an exception to Barth's stronger 
statements, such as that the human being is "no longer single but a couple" (CD III/l, 308). Jesus 
is not a couple but single. That cannot be allowed to impugn his humanity—as Barth does not 
intend it to do.  
Corollary: Barth on Homosexuality  
Although Christian attitudes towards Jews and women are hardly settled, sexual orientation is 
currently sometimes a louder and more controverted a topic of debate. Religious people in moral 
quandaries about homosexuality appeal to thinkers like Barth when they want to honor their 
tradition in its most faithfully adequate and rationally sophisticated form. The exception proves 
the rule: a leading Jewish ethicist, David Novak, appeals to Barth's powerful reading of how the 
tradition opposes homosexual practice. He does so by claiming that Barth has in common with 
the rabbis the connection between homosexuality and idolatry, Paul in Romans 1 being the 
obvious link.69 Oddly, the most important texts offer little support. Barth's commentary on 
Romans 1 leaves homosexuality alone, even when it appears (to speak anachronistically) in the 
text, and prefers to connect heterosexuality with idolatry! So he writes (in a passage in which I 
retain the English translation of Mensch by "man," since the Menschen Barth has in mind 
become paradig-matically male):  
Wherever the qualitative distinction between men and the final Omega is overlooked and 
misunderstood, that fetishism is bound to appear in which God is experienced in birds and 
fourfooted things, and finally, or rather primarily, in the likeness of corruptible man—
Personality, the Child[!], the Woman[!]—and in the half-spiritual, half-material creations, 
exhibitions, and representations of [God's] creative ability—Family [!], Nation, State, Church, 
Fatherland.70  
Note well: At the very place where Novak locates a connection between idolatry and 
homosexuality, Barth locates a connection between idolatry and certain concepts that Barth 
regards as idolatrously defending: Woman (by which Barth means of course the heterosexual 
male's desire for Woman), even Child and Family, and he puts them in a series that ends with 
Fatherland.  
The ethics of the section "Man and Woman" (§54.1), on the other hand, explicates the divine 
command in terms of the very abstractions we have been talking about, and against which Barth 
himself had fulminated decades earlier. Homosexuality turns out to be a matter of "a masculinity 
free from woman and a femininity free from man" (CD III/4,166). Granted, it would constitute a 
violation of co-humanity to uphold either "freedom from woman" or "freedom from man," which 
strictures would seem to rule out both permanent separatism and an all-male priesthood. But only 
the 19th C. romantic constructions of das Männliche and das Weibliche actually do the work 
here. It is true that Barth does quote Rom. 1:25-27 in his exposition. But it does him no work 
outside his abstractive categories. And there is no support in his more considered commentary, 
no mention of homosexuality at all, even as (or especially because) he follows Paul. If this is so, 
the tension will make Barth's pronouncements on homosexuality at once more complicated and 
more interesting for his religious admirers on both sides of the current debates. 
The Holy Spirit Improves Barth's Doctrine of Co-humanity, Because Consummation is 
Appropriate to the Spirit  
Consider the following speculations, which seem on the surface at least to hold some promise:  
That the helping relationship should be a mutual being-with-the-other we learn first from Christ. 
We know it, Barth might better have said, in Christ's saying that "greater love has no one than 
this, than to lay down life for friends." We hear its promise, looking back, not between Adam 
and Eve. Neither of them lays down life for the other; rather Genesis has it that each leads the 
other into death. The old Adam, like the old Eve, does not foreshadow the new in being-with-
the-other, but must be overcome. In fact, if we look for a typological foreshadowing of the 
Christ's laying down life for his friends of a covenantal sort, the bible does not present man-
woman as the paradigm pair, but Ruth's words to Naomi: "Entreat me not to leave you or to 
return from following you: for where you go I will go, and where you lodge I will lodge: your 
people shall be my people, and your God my god: where you die I will die and there will I be 
buried. May the LORD do so to me and more also if even death parts me from you" (Ruth 1:16-
17). That same-sex covenant, often quoted at weddings, is given priority over child-bearing when 
the women say, "your daughter-in-law who loves you is more than seven sons" (4:15), and over 
Ruth's seduction of Boaz, when their son is attributed to the mother-in-law: "a son has been born 
to Naomi" (4:17). Like the other "irregular" conceptions picked out by the inclusion of the 
mothers' names in Matthew's genealogy—Tamar, Rahab, Ruth, and "the wife of Uriah"—this 
one foreshadows the irregular conception of Jesus, who would, like Ruth, covenant his life for 
his friends.  
That the one flesh serves not merely for the production of children for us, but, by the rigors of 
communal sanctification, for the production of children of God, we might better learn from 
Christ's addition (Mt. 10:9 and parallels) that God has joined it together. Genesis states only that 
the two become one flesh; in keeping with its ironic tone it refrains from ascribing the 
relationship that Adam and Eve are living out to God's doing. Christ's addition of divine agency 
represents the consummation of human nature that belongs less to nature as Adam and Eve 
exemplify it than to grace—as God, in the incarnation, proves able to use flesh, and even 
sexuality, for God's own purposes, namely the sanctification, in the asceticism of a common life, 
of the human being.71 We recognize it, looking back, not between Adam and Eve, but perhaps in 
Hosea's reluctant loyalty to Gomer: "And the LORD said to me, 'Go again, love a woman who is 
beloved of a paramour and is an adulteress; even as the LORD loves the people of Israel, though 
they turn to other gods and love cakes of raisins.' So I bought her for fifteen shekels of silver and 
a homer and a lethech of barley" (Hos. 3:1-2). To define the one flesh in terms of Adam and Eve 
tends to make it work straightforwardly, instead of redemptively, ecclesially, and 
christologically, and therefore to conceal its theological function.  
The right use of the shame that Genesis delights in linking with its first mention of their eyes we 
might better learn from Christ's warning that "whoever is ashamed of me and of my words in this 
adulterous and sinful generation, of that one will the Son of humanity also be ashamed." Right 
shame, christologically defined, is a matter of loyalty to the good in the face of sin, a sort of 
loyalty that Adam and Eve signally fail to show. Their loyalty after having led each other into sin 
and blamed each other is a matter of default, not virtue. Rather we recognize right shame in 
Jonathan's loyalty to David in the face of Saul's anger, where, so far from a man-woman context, 
his father appears to accuse him of a homosexual relationship, i.e., one that will not result in 
children, and Jonathan runs to David, kisses him, and takes on the role of a king's daughter in 
passing the succession to David and envisioning for himself the role of consort: " 'You son of a 
perverse, rebellious woman, do I not know you have chosen the son of Jesse to your own shame, 
and to the shame of your mother's nakedness?' ... and Jonathan rose from the table in fierce anger 
... went out into the field to the appointment with David ... and they kissed one another, and wept 
with one another ... And he said to him, Tear not; for the hand of Saul my father shall not find 
you: you shall be king over Israel, and I shall be next to you'" (I Sam. 20:30, 34, 35, 41; 23:17).  
Among illustrations of I-Thou relationships in what Jesus called Scripture Barth ought to have 
noticed that much better examples than Adam and Eve show up between Ruth and Naomi, Hosea 
and Gomer, Jonathan and David—with a striking lack of mutuality in the man-woman pair, even 
though it may constitute the best candidate for a covenantal I-Thou relationship among the 
Hebrew possibilities. If we are right to find those relationships better examples of Barth's own 
rubrics of "looking each other in the eye," "speaking and listening," "offering mutual assistance," 
and doing so with gladness; if we are right to find the Genesis author humoring and ironizing the 
relationship between Adam and Eve; and if we are right to worry that I-Thou categories in the 
case of Adam and Eve, although not in the case of Jesus, tend to crowd out the community and 
the Spirit; then we will find the paradigmatic expression of co-humanity as man-woman 
unbiblical, untrinitarian, and anti-ecclesial.  
The kind of abstraction Barth avoids is an abstraction from Christ. The kind he commits is an 
abstraction from the Spirit. It is the Spirit to whom we appropriate the messiness of biblical 
histories, the ways in which God's work resists reduction to type, in which God's grace shows 
greater abundance (Rom. 5:12) and diversity (Heb. 1:1) than Barth gives it credit for. There is 
more even than Christ: the overplus is the Spirit, as Milbank has it, "a Trinitarianism without 
reserve."71 The abstraction that Barth overcomes has reservations. God's work in the Spirit 
overcomes them. Thus in stories of praedestinatio gemina we read of third parties, not just two. 
Election always takes place concretely in a community and an environment. It is the community 
gathered by the Spirit; it is the environment that the Spirit creates, which is that of the Trinity 
projected onto creation. So too expressions of co-humanity. They too always take place in a 
community and an environment. They too, in biblical stories, involve more than binary types—
more than rejected-elected pairs, more than man-woman pairs—complications and concreteness 
that the Spirit can handle, if dialectic cannot. They too require the presence of others, like the 
witnesses at a marriage, the guests at a wedding feast, or the public at the pronouncing of a 
verdict, that do not fit neatly into I and Thou, but do correspond to the celebration by the Spirit 
of the love between the Father and the Son.  
What about anagogy? Does the saying about Christ and the church lead to theologically justified 
speculation about women and men as organized groups in the community of God, the way Israel 
and the nations do? I can think of three proposals that tend in that direction. One is Paul 
Evdokimov's Woman and the Salvation of the World; another is Hans Urs von Balthasare Die 
Personen des Spiels; a third, by an anthropologist, is Mary Douglas's.73 But none of these is 
persuasive. Evdokimov trades on too many ontological stereotypes, for all the surprising and 
eschatologically fruitful ways he uses them. Von Balthasar treats groups again as types—the 
Marian type, the Petrine type—and is not eschatological enough. Douglas's suggestion that the 
Catholic Church should set up a counter-hierarchy to the priesthood and episcopacy, made up of 
women, shows no chance of being adopted. Initially, the practice of anagogy for developing an 
exegesis about gender looks decidedly less promising than about Jews and Gentiles, even 
downright dangerous.  
More is to be learned by looking into the actual practice of anagogy when it flourished, in the 
Middle Ages. The prime locus of anagogy was in fact about gender: it was the Song of Songs. 
Furthermore, after Genesis and the Psalms, the Song of Songs was the biblical book that 
attracted the most commentary among the books of the Hebrew Bible.74  
[T]he reasons why the erotic model of the love of God so appealed to the monastic 
commentator of the middle ages—and the vast majority of these commentators were 
monks—had to do with very fundamental preoccupations of the monastic theologian ... 
rooted in the monks' theological eschatology, in their sense that their life of partial 
withdrawal from the world situated them at a point of intersection between this world and 
the next, ... between anticipation and fulfillment. This meant that the concept of love as a 
"yearning" or "longing"—as an amor-desiderium, or, in Greek, eros, exactly expressed 
what they wanted by way of a language of love.7S  
How then do the speculations of monks apply to modern women and men, especially when 
monastic life and its influence has so drastically declined since the Reformation? The answer lies 
in recovering the sense in which the household is a little church, a little ascetic community—only 
to be hazarded because the wider church can save us from and redeem it76—so that marriage and 
monasticism share, not opposed, but the same ascetic end, sanctification by means of the body. 
Then marriage is not about satisfaction, but, precisely at its best, about yearning and anticipation 
of the satisfaction that it cannot provide. Anagogy then becomes a means for putting marriage 
into a new context, and recovering the insights of monasticism. Here Evdokimov has a very great 
deal to teach us, as does Zizioulas, with his ecclesial hypostasis of the person.77 But that is a 
paper for another day.  
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